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Paul Bloom 
Many philosophers and psychologists believe that only
people with rich language skills are capable of abstract
reasoning. A man with a severe linguistic impairment
poses a striking challenge to this view.
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There is an obvious relationship between being able to
think and being able to talk. As Darwin noted [1], it could
hardly be an accident that the animal with the most
powerful reasoning ability is also the animal with the
richest system of communication. And many philosophers
and psychologists suggest that knowing a natural language
such as English or Chinese is essential for complicated
reasoning [2,3] — because such reasoning requires access
to the sort of representational system that can only be
provided though learning a natural language.
One way to explore this view is to study someone who has
lost his language. Varley and Siegal [4] recently published
in Current Biology a fascinating case-study of such an indi-
vidual. As a result of a bacterial infection, S.A. developed a
large lesion in his left hemisphere. This left him with a
severe motor speech disorder (apraxia), as well as a severe
language disorder (aphasia). Several tests show that S.A.’s
language is severely impaired. His performance on
sentence comprehension, both spoken and written, is at
the chance level; he cannot comprehend verbs; and he
cannot judge the grammaticality of sentences. But he has
not lost the desire or ability to communicate. Because of
the poor intelligibility of his speech, he prefers to express
himself through writing. His written messages consist
mostly of nouns, adjectives, and adverbs — verbs are
absent. S.A. does not produce sentences; instead he
strings together words in a random fashion. For instance,
he might describe a scene as ‘man the blue a orange’ or
‘woman a radio’. While many patients who are diagnosed
as ‘agrammatic aphasics’ retain some residual grammatical
capacities, S.A. has entirely lost this aspect of language.
What about the rest of S.A.’s mental life? When tested on
the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, a task that involves
‘executive function’, he scores in the top 10% of a normal
sample matched for age and education. When tested on
the WAIS Picture Arrangement Test, a standard test of
non-verbal intelligence that involves arranging a series of
cards to tell a sensible story, his performance was also
better than normal. A third task probed his understanding
of causal relationships — he had to pick out the likely
cause of an event, understanding, for instance, that an alco-
holic drink is likely to cause an automobile accident, while
an axe and a helicopter are not. He was perfect at this task.
The most interesting result concerns S.A.’s ability to
understand the mental states of other people. This is an
aspect of social cognition, sometimes called ‘theory of
mind’. The particular task used by Varley and Siegal
requires an understanding of false beliefs. To answer the
questions correctly, S.A. needed to appreciate both a true
state of affairs — for instance, that a pill bottle actually
contains buttons — as well as a false mental state of
another person — for instance, that the person believes
that the pill bottle contains pills. Such a task poses serious
problems for children under the age of four, and is also
impaired in older individuals who suffer from autism [5].
S.A.’s performance, in contrast, was virtually perfect. 
Despite his agrammatism, then, S.A. was able to reason in
a sophisticated manner about the physical and social
world. Varley and Siegal [4] note that this is consistent
with ‘modular’ theories of language and cognition which
propose that the neural and computational structures
implicated in grammar are distinct from those involved in
non-linguistic thought. Their results further suggest that
the computational system necessary for understanding and
computing social and causal relations is not derived from a
learned natural language such as English, but instead
exists as a universal ‘mentalese’ or ‘language of thought’
[6]. More generally, S.A.’s intact capacities are a challenge
to the view that language is necessary for abstract thought. 
This is not the first case-study of this type, of course.
There have always been unfortunate individuals who lack
language, through brain damage or through social depriva-
tion. (In many cases, these were deaf children who were
raised in a speaking community, and never provided with
access to sign language.) The mental lives of such individ-
uals have long been a matter of debate by scholars inter-
ested in the relationship between language and thought.
In the 1800s, William James maintained that at least some
of the language-less deaf were capable of ‘abstract thought
of a decidedly subtle kind, both scientific and moral’. But
other commentators, including many contemporary
scholars, argue that severe retardation will inevitably occur
in such cases (see [7] for review). The evidence here is
murky, mostly because what we know about these
individuals tends to be anecdotal. Varley and Siegal’s
study [4] is unusual in its careful empirical testing of the
domains of both language and cognition. 
Some objections to Varley and Siegal’s conclusions come
to mind. Perhaps S.A. still retained English — perhaps he
was still able to think in English — but was unable to
exploit this internal language in the course of production
and comprehension. To put it differently, perhaps his
problems have to do with linguistic performance, not with
linguistic competence. This is conceivable, but not very
plausible, given that his impairment was reflected in so
many different ways, in production and comprehension, in
speech and in writing. 
Another reply is to concede that, although you do not
need to currently know English in order to reason about
the mental states of other people, you do need to have once
known English. More generally, perhaps the learning of a
language leads to the formation of certain cognitive
abilities that non-linguistic creatures could not
possess — but once language has been learned, it is no
longer needed; just as one could throw out the blueprints
once a building has been erected. Data from an adult such
as S.A. cannot directly bear on this hypothesis, and Varley
and Siegal [4] are appropriately careful to note that their
conclusions apply only to ‘mature brain functioning’. What
one would want to know, then, is whether an adult who
had never learned language — such as the deaf man
discussed by James — could solve the same tasks as S.A.
For obvious reasons, such evidence is currently hard to
come by (but see [8] for an intriguing exception). 
If Varley and Siegal [4] are right, does this mean that
grammar and thought have nothing to do with one
another? Not at all. For one thing, a powerful communica-
tion system could only evolve in the context of a powerful
system of non-linguistic thought — an animal would only
evolve a recursive and hierarchical grammar, for instance,
if it were capable of recursive and hierarchical thought [9].
Every species gets the syntax it deserves. Also, grammar
allows for the efficient transmission of information, and
hence an individual or group of individuals without
grammar will find it difficult to learn from other people
about important aspects of the social and physical world.
(This is why intellectual deficits often accompany
language loss in children, particularly when there is no
attempt made to compensate for the child’s language loss
[7].) Finally, grammar must interact with abstract thought,
simply because we use grammar to convey our ideas and
understand those of others. 
Nobody doubts there is some relationship between
grammar and thought. The case of S.A. is fascinating
because it demonstrates a way in which they are not
related. At least in the mature human, abstract reasoning is
not dependent on grammar; it is a distinct modular system. 
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